,i^.M ^ -m %
il^'. \», W-. # # ^
;jr^ [* ti% ^t ii^ 1^ 'p • :t. 1
;t ;|t vi .* > ;! ^ * ^ ^ ^ ■■$ )
J J: * % W M
■^ i#^
t -4 ■# !■
^ ■*
(fc\.(i^X i*\'>.
S ;^ ^ Of ^; ■
[f (I:. ^. *, ^ ^ ^. *, j. i^.,
^ it;, il. ^. *
I si * l* 1
I^H?. J.?-. yer:. >^^. i^ .p. pi ;^-. .;|i. .^,, :'
, t«, \^ * * # ^
^,^,p,li^/^ * .. . . .. .- ... ..-,
M^ it. K >. #. >. » #■ W *^- », I
i^, ^, ^. ^ : .», * ■». p.. •» ^ m: *■■ ^^ #'^>^ ^
"" "^ ' P. ^ W W f- m -^ !»■ W .'^ r -
'- "- ■' *. %.^ %-:^:\ %■ %: ^- 1^- ^
-.. r.-. «^. ^. ^. .t. i*: %■ ^ |l Ds ;^ ^■- %
It ^ # ;« i I .\|i .if ;t ^ ^^ ^
;;.-ijl. P ^ ^ -Hi: ^: ^ ^; ;t.^'j|.' ^
.- ^ ^^, *■ :*. *■ *■ t r ■ ^' *^'■'^■
P, m '§
Kf
%'% »v
^^ ^:: 1:. fc i|;'"(r
P^ ^■
#;; irite'"*'
s* it' i^; _ii' It
. *■. >^:: i; :»: »^ »
■,'t i- ■»> *■ 5
»l *
^'.> 1^'. p.'
% ■*
*C*C^f.'J/ft'yi^">'
#'.ii
*^. 1^ ^' >■ i
/y
E 713 .C95 Copy 1
AiiiH'Xuliuu ut llunuiiait I"-!;!)))!'
STEECll
HON. i:. 1). CKUMrACKE JJ,
of'ixdiaxa. In TiiK House of ]?EPitESENTATi\Ti:s,
Tncsilaij, Jmie I',, ISOS.
Tho IIi.u>o haviiiR uiiilor considor.itinii tho joint resolution (H. Rc3. .'iu'J) to provide for iinnexiuK tho Hawaiiiui Isliinds to the United States—
Mr. CRl'MPACKKK said :
Mr. Spkakkk: I um opposod to Ibc annexation of tlio Hawaiian Islands to this country beeansc, upon the whole, it appears to nie that the project ■would brin^ iiioro burdens Ih.in bonelits. It i)robably would bring sonio bonelits, for it is hard to conceive of a scheme so Avild that has not some eonipeusatory features. Hut, sir, in a matter of such grave importaneo as this, involving, as it does, a radical change of our historical policy, it ought not to receive our sanction Tinles's it is clear, considering its future as well as its present etlects, that there is a decided preponderance of advantage in it, and every doubt should be resolved against tho proposition.
Wo should accept nothing by faith alone in a matter of such transcendent importance. It is claimed that the people of this country, almost as a unit, are in favor of tho proposition. That assertion I deuv; tho masses of the people have given the subject very little thought, but almost every expression from the farmers and wage earners has been ajrainst it. It is true, there appears to bo considerable sentiment in its favor, .judging from i)ublic prints and utterances, but even that is largely sentiment, that has not ripened into conviction. It has been well said that one noisy man •will make more noise than forty (in iet ones; and that aphorism is peculiarly tnio of tho situation respecting tho iiuostiou of annexation.
THE COSSTITCTIONAI. ASPF.'T.
In the liist jilace, the resolutions ought to be deleated lieeanse it is an attempt to accomplish by tho legislative department of tho Government that which tho organic law clearly requires to bo dono bj' the Exeei\live. Without entering i\])on an analysis of the Fed- eral Constitution. I desire to advert to tho fact that each depart- ment of the Government is and nni.->t bo independent of the others, and it would be dangerous ami revolutionary for one department t<> arrogate functions and powirs vested by the Constitution in tho others. Under the division of powers the President has absolutely no legislative authority except thoqualitied negative in the form of tho veto. Kvorv member of this House will admit not only that the President has constitutional authority to negotiati> for the annex- ation of territory, •ubjoct to tho approval of the Senate, but that his is the only proper agency to accomplish that end, because it in- volves the exercise of the tfcaty-maUing power exclusively \ested in tho Presidint l>y the (•oustitutioii.
3m 1
4^
«-*'•> vy <lJ '-l
; • c,*
x>.* The question is purely an executive one, witliout a single leglsla-
iive feature. Tliere is no express authority in tlie Federal Constitu-
^' tion for the acquisition of territory, and in the early history of the
. Eepiibiic the existence of that authority was denied by many able
■^ statesmen. But the always convenieut doctrine of inherent power
was conceived, and now no one questions the authority of the people
through their constitutional agencies to enlarge the public domain
by the annexation of additional territory. But every lawyer must
admit that negotiations for the annexation of outlying territory are
executive in character, regardless of the form in which they are
placed. The legislative formula, "He it resolved, etc.," can not
change a proposition essentially executive in its character fo one of
a legislative nature.
This body has no executive powers whatever, excepting snch as are incident to its own organization and government. Negotiations for the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands were lirst entered upon by the President in the form of a treaty with those assuming to act for the islands, containing the same provisions as the pending reso- lutions; but tlie treaty reqiiired the assent of two-thirds of tlie (Senators, and it became apparent that it could not command that assent, so it has been abandoned and this expedient invented to evade the limitations of the Constitution. The simplest treaty with a foreign country must be ratified by two-thirds of the Sen- ators, but it is gravely claimed that a treaty of annexation aft'ecting the destiny of the whole nation may be sanctioned by a bare majority of the Senators.
Any measure that fails to receive the sanction of the people, through their constitutional organism, ought to be defeated in an attempt to subvert the Constitution, whatever may be its merits. The jireservation of the constitutional limitations and guarantya is of infinitely greater importance than the acquisition of new ter- ritory, however desirable. No end will justify means of such a rev- olutionary character. But it is claimed that a precedent exists for the proposed actimi in the acquisition of Texas. It is true that Texas was admitted into the Union by a joint resolution of Con- gress, after a treaty for its annexation had failed to bo ratified by the Senate, but it was admitted as a State and not as a Territory.
Section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution, confers upon Congress the iiower to admit new States into the Union, and it was insisted that as Texas was to be admitted into the Union as a State and not annexed as a Territory it could be done by joint resolution. That doctrine w%a3 combated by the ablest lawyers and statesmen of the time, on the ground that the power to admit States into the Union embraced only States created out of territory already a part of the national domain. Congress took the other view, however, and Texas was admitted into the Union as a State by joint resolution, and the action was acquiesced in by the people. But never in the history of the country has territory been admitted as such by joint resolution or by Congressional action.
Florida, Louisiana, and Alaska were aunexed by treaty, and Cali- fornia by conquest. The attempts to annex St. Thomas and the Dominican Hepublic were by treaty, and not by joint resolution. Upon the failure of the treaty to annex San Domingo President Grant suggested that it be done by Congressional action, but the jiower to so acquire it was quite generally denied. Senator Thur- nian, of Ohio, one of the ablest lawyers of the country, in discussing the (question, said:
You can not by joint resolntion .annex Snn Dominjro .is a Territory; you must anuiix lier as .a Statu if you annex lier by joint resolution. Tliero is no clause in the Constitution that ^wovides for the acquisition of territory by joint resolution, 3441
uulcss it 1)0 that (,'oiisrr»s iiiiiv inhiiit now Stales in t« llio I'ninn. It wan upon lli« nfunient tlint tlioro was no limitiitioii tijion that i)o\vor (o ndinlt n<'w Slati« iiil-i 111" I'uion; lliat it was not limited to tonitory bili.!ij;inj; to Iho InilPil State*, b>it that territory l»lonj;in;; to a loroipi i)owi-r niijlit bo admitted into tin. I nio:i aa a Slate. It was niion tliut ilodrino that tho ro.iolution in th(! iukooI Ti van wuh ))assrd. lint no ono has uv.r iirctvmlod that > uu . ould by joint loxoluliou aunix territory as a Territory without admiltiug it as a State.
Tho liistoiy of thi.s roimtry aftonl.s no proccdcnt for llio ;iniicxii- tion of trnitoiy as siuh liy joint lesoliitiim of Congress, and any sin-h attempt isClearlv repii^Miant to tlic (•oii>titntioii.
Tho Federal ."^iipreiiio t'onit has ropcatctUy atriniictl the viows of Chief .Instieo Marshall in tho case of Insiiraiieo Coniiiany r. Canter (I Teters, nil'), that tho constitutional nietlnnU of aciinirin;,' aiUli- tional territory are liy treaty aiulconciueal. Will anyone eon tend that this body has'anv share in tho treaty-niakinj,' jiowei • I .issert, as a proposition of' law, that tho lloii-so of Kejircsentatn e.s and tho rrcsidont possess no concurrent powcr.'i. I f the pendi ii^' jtroposi t ion is legislative in its eliaraeter the rrosident bad no aiilhority to negotiate tho treaty in tho first place, and if it is executive this body has no constitutional authority over it -whatever. It is alto- gether probable that if tho resolutions shall pass botii branebes ol Congress and receive Executive approval no one will ever (|nestion onrFitle to the island,'?, but tho habit of inventing .subterfugo to ovado the plain ])rovlsion3 of tho Constitution is dangerous and destructive in its tcinloncics.
Suppose tho President should disagree to tho resolutions and should veto llicni and tliey should subsequently pass l»oth branches of Congress by a two-thirds vote, notwitliRtandiiig the veto, would it be claimed that annexation so attemi>tcd would have any eousti- tntioual sanction? I apprehend not. The courts have no authority to review tho exercise of political powers, and for this reason greater caution should eharaetcrizo the action of the (jovcrnmeut, because of tho danger of overriding established limitations by insidious encroachment.
CLIMATIC CO.VDITIO.V?.
I am oppose<l to tho project bocanso it will incorporate iiilo our l)olitical system territory over 2,000 miles from our coast, under a blazing, tropical sun— territory that can contribute but little to the greatness of the Ivopublic and will necessarily detract from the high standard of its citizenship. Tho dignity of labor i.s the glory ol our civilization, and its standard can never bo lowered without material injury to the general welfare. AVhite labor never has gone into tropical countries and it never will go there. It is proposed to annex tcrritorv capable of supporting a million people, in which all labor must bo'performed by people of a very low order of civil and industrial life, and bring them into direct competition with the high-class, intelligent labor of tho States.
That policy, Hir, has been repeatedly repudiated by the poojjlc ot this countrvat tho polls. Tho protection of American lal)or from competitioii with tho cheap labor of other countries has been a cardinal doctrine of tho Itepuldiean party ever since its organiza- tion. Tho ingenuity of our etatesmanship is now being taxed to invent methods of removing convict labor from competition with free labor, and vet it i.s asserted that it will not degrade the intelli- gent labor of America to put it into direct competition with ill-i>aid Bca-island, .Japanese, and Chinese workmen. That competition can not bo avoided if annexation shall be aee(uiii)rished. I mty ol interest, sentiment, and destiny, so far as it can bo attained, is liighly necessary to the happiness of our people and the ))erpctnity of"]{epubli<an institutions, and we are already si) diversilied that 3141
perplexing and dangerous political and economical problems con- IJront us, demanding solution.
The difference in the degree of development in various parts of the country are so marked that ugly antagonisms exist and popular discontent is fomented. Measures adapted to one section are un- suited to the demands of another, and legislation, general in its scope, must be so compromised to secure something near equality of operation, that its efficiency is in a large degree impaired. These discordarrt elements constitute the gravest danger vrith which we have to contend, whether domestic or foreign. Gentlemen contend that laws may be made for the government of colonial acquisitions, adapted to the degree of civil development, and that we need not ad- mit the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands into full political part- ner.sliip with us until it is deemed expedient.
The principle that all citizens are equal before the law is the bed- rock of Kepiiblican institutions, and a policy that will discriminate between citizens is repugnant to the genius of free government. Equality is the soul of the Republic, and it is the beginning of the end when this great country can tind excuses to make invidious distinctions between its own citizens. Besides this, there is no place in our political system for permanent colonial governments. The Constitution contemplates that every foot of territory within our dominion, outside of the District of Columbia, shall ultimately form part of a State with a citizenship equal to that of all the States. The Federal Supreme Court, in the famous Dred Scott de- cisioUj declared that —
There is no power given by the Constitntion to the Federal Government to establish and maintain colonies bordering on the United States, nor .at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its pleasure, nor to enlarge its territoiial limits, except by the admission of new States ; * • * The power to expand the terri- tory of the United States by the admission of new St.ates is plainly given; and in the construction of this power by all the Departments of the Government it lias been held to authorize the acquisition of territory, not fit for admission at the time, but to bo admitted as soon as its population and situation would entitle it to admission. It is acquired to become a State, and not to be held as a colony and governed by Congress with absolute authority.
What becomes of the policy advanced by annexationists that the Government can permanently control the islands by a system fitted to their situation, capacity, and develoi)ment? It is not the policy of the Government to admit any class of people into the political household that can not intelligently ^and helpfully participate in free government and profit by its privileges. I confess that I have some sentiment upon the question of citizenship. I love to look upon my fellow-citizen with the consciousness that, however hum- ble his station in life, he is the equal before the law of the greatest in the land, and that from his loins may spiing a posterity that will bless humanity and glorify republican institutions. A race that does not possess these splendid possibilities must lower the dignity of our citizenship.
Tlie marvelous growth and uneven development of the country are largely responsible for present conditions, and many of our most troublesome questions will be removed by time. Our interests will be more e(iuitably adjusted and grow into more harmonious rela- tions with further development. The standard of life in all parts of the country must be measured according to a common scale, and we have now as great a diversification of climate, resource, and tendency as can be successfullj' trained together under one political organization. The Temperate Zone, bj' inexorable law, has always contained, and always will contain, the highest intelligence of the world and all that is most helpful in civilized life. The tropical climate stifles growth and impedes progress in the individual, and, 3141
of roiirso, ill society, for tlio iiidividiiiil ia tlio Hoiial unit. (Inr t'xif^i'ucifs slioiilil l>c iircssiii;^ iiuU-od to .justify tho iiicoriioi.itiou into our social system of territory \vhi<li, iUnn its uii!iltcral)Iti con- ditions, can not keep ]tacc wit li us in our march to a iii^^lier iIo»tiny.
'I'lie situation ccrtaini.v docs iiotjustifN tiiat radical ileiiartiiio at tliis time, and 1 sincerely hope it invi'r will. 'I'lm islands are as Avidely separated from us socially and industrially as they arc phys- ically. There is not a siu;;lo tciidoiicy or interc.st in common between us, and our destinies are uualteraldy diver^joiit. The peo- ple of the islands are iiicajjablo of sclf-j^ovcinment, and al\\a_\H will be. Xo itro;;rcssi\ e rcimldic can e\er endure in the torrid zone, 'llio infusion of that exotic into our national currents will tend to corrui)t tuir whole system; it will be a fcsti'ring sore in the body politic, to irritate and annoy for all time. A pressing neces- sity is recogni/ed for the oxclusion from our domain of immigrants whoso inlluciiee upon our institutions would lie deleterious, and yet it is pro]ioscd to introduce at one coup n whole race of jieople 80 stolid and uuresponsi\e iu tlnir very natures that they can not be assimilated by our ci\ili/.iiig forces.
The suggestion that the Mongolians shall be excluded from the islands when they shall have passed under our control is no remedy, for the natives aio C(iually objectionable, and no desirable jteoplo can become inured to that environment. The climate and soil i)rc- cliulo the hope of a high civilization, and if the islands should bo stocUetl with the best Anglo-Saxon blood they would degenerate into a race of indolents in a few generations, under the inlluenceof the enervating surrouudiugs. Ho who declares to the contrary dis- putes an immutable law of individual development and. goes into the face of all history and experience.
Do Ave want a country incapable of keeping step with us to tho inspiring music of jirogress, a country that will oi)erate as a check, a drawback, to our forward niovoment! Insular possessions so far away from the continent would add to the causes for international complic.itions and embarrassments and become a luxuriant soil for the growth of pt)litical peculation and scandal.
THE COMMERCE Of THE ISLANDS.
Much h;is been said about the importance to us of the trade of the islands. Those who have given the matter careful considera- tion for years past must know that thoir trade h.as been an expen- sivo luxury. It is unquestionably true that tho islands iiroduco staple articles of commerce similar to those produced by other tropical countries, but they do not contribute as'ugle article to tho world's trade tho like of which can not begotten elsewhere. Tho Burronudiiigs and habits of living of the inhabitants are such that they reiiuire comjiaratively few of tho jnoducts of this country. Their tra(b> iiaturall.\- belongs to us to the extent that it is mutu- ally benelicial, and their geographical situation guarantees us al- most abstiluto control of it without annexation or treaty concessions.
It is not necessary to admit them to our jxilitical liresido in order to obtain that which wo can have without. It would be dearly jturchased, indeed, if we were compelled to do that. Their com- merce was insignilit ant jirior to the treaty with this country, in 187.5, admitting their jtroducts intoour porta free of tlnty. Their rhief article of export is sugar, and tho <'oncessions exteiuled by tho treaty gave a powert'ul impnlbc to sugar growing on the islands. Tho attention of American iinestors liad been attracted to the situ- ation and private corporations were orgaiii/ed to c«>ntrol the sugar plantations. Jsubstantially all the Hugar plantations <if the island
are now in tlic hands of those corporations and over 75 per cent of tlie stock is owned by American investors.
It was the influence of those stockholders that procured the treaty. With the enormous advantage secured by the treaty over other sugar-producing countries, the corporate influences induced. the Hawaiian Government to negotiate treaties with Japan, China, and other countries to enable the planters to import laborers under the contract system, that they might have cheap labor to cultivate the plantations. Thousands of Japanese and Chinese laborers were brought to the islands under those treaties, and they now consti- tute the chief industrial force of the country.
With the coolie system of labor and a rebate of duties by this country, the i)roflt8of the sugar baroiis were enormous. The plant- ers have sold substantially the entire product to the sugar refiners' trust in this country, delivered at San Francisco, at a price one- fourth of a cent a pound below the current New York price. The rebate of duty did not cheapen sugar to the consumers in this country, but it was a clear bonus to the sugar planters' trust of Hawaii and the refiners' trust in America. Our trade with the islands last year amounted to $18,377,000. We purchased from them $13,687,000 of products, mostly sugar, and sold them goods to the amount of $4,690,000. We paid them about $9,000,000 more than we received from them, and in addition, the rebate of duties we gave them for the privilege of purchasing their sugar at the same rate we could have gotten it from other countries amounted to $5,354,512.80.
What did the people of this country receive for this enormous concession? Not a farthing, outside of the sugar trust. We gave more in the way of rebate by over $600,000 than our entire sales to them amounted to. In other words, we paid the people of those islands full market price for their sugar, the same as if no rebate had been granted. We gave them $4,690,000 of our products and $600,000 in cash in addition ! That is called a commercial reciprocity treaty! The reciprocity feature is a fiction. If the sugar planters and refiners had sufficient influence to bring about that treaty and the treaties between Hawaii and Japan and China respecting con- tract labor in 1875, if they had the two Governments by the throat then, why have they not power enough to accomplish political union between them in 18981
IS THS SUGAE TECST AGAINST ANNEXATION?
Why, Mr. Speaker, gentlemen tell us that the American sugar trust is opposing annexation, and therefore we ought to establish it. Questions of this magnitude ought to be settled by reason, and not by prejudice. It is not very complimentary to the statesman- ship of this body to attempt to influence its action by considera- tions of that kind. But what is the truth respecting the attitude of the sugar trust toward the scheme? Agents of that institution are men of adroitness, and they know well enough that if they openly espoused a measure it would have to be exceptionally meritorious to muster votes enough to prevail. They fully appreciate the inten- sity of the prejudice against that organization, and if they desire a proposition to succeed they can nothelp it more than by ostensi- bly opposing it.
But where do the interests of that organization lie? For where its treasures are, there will its heart be also. The sugar refiners' trust receives directly about one fourth of the bonus granted by the Gov- ernment to the Hawaiian sugar, and it is known that officers of the trust are large stockholders in the sugar-producing corporations on the islands. The bonus has averaged over $3,000;000 a year since 3141
tlio date of the tieatv, and lias ajxurc^iatcil llu; ciiorinoii.s snni of $tir>,(HH),0()t>. A sum iiioio fliaii sullificiit to Imy oveiy foot of laud in the islands taken from tl)e pockets of tlio ])eopI<' of this coiinlrv witliont any compensatory return! Tho treaty is lialde to ho ahro- j;ated ;it any time and this immense, soureeof rV-venm- rut off. It is the umliilieal lurd tliiou^'h wliicli the sui^ar-jirowinj^ harcuisand th(^ relimrs" trust have heeu ahsorhiug nourishment, and they can not alford to havo it severed.
Annexation wouhl secure free markets in this country and all tho henelits mjoyid under tho treaty. an<l in addition it would seruro stahility of .i;overnment on the islands. ANithout ^oin;j into tho ethieal questions involved in tho proposition to annex, it must ho admitted that tho existinj^ jrovornmeiit is not deejily rooted in the atVeetions of the, peoi)le antl a revolt is liahlo to oeeur at any time. By annexation they would secure open markets and a stahle govern- ment, two factors hii;hly essential to tho sujjar interests, 'i'ho eonuneree of tho islands has heen larj^ely developed under the impetus of tho treaty and dei)euds for its m;iinteuauec ujjon the ex- tension of tho treaty or annexation. Uur trade with any foreign country mijilit be vastly increased by similar cnc-sided concessions, but wo would soon grow ])oor under that kind of trafhe.
Jiut, Mr. Speaker, gentlemen assure us that annexation would ]mt an end to tho contract-labor system on tho islands. Would it f J.et us examiuo that question briefly. In the first place, if it did, the planters could atVord to ]):iy twice as high a rate of wages as they are paying under the jirescnt system, anil then have an annual bonus over legitimate prolits of $2,000,000. Hut American labor never will cultivate the sugar plantations ou those islands, and unless Mongolians and South Sea Islanders are employed they will go uncultivated. White labor Avill never contest with tlio' half- eivili/cd hordes of the Orient and the Pacilic islands for industrial supremacy in that lield, and natives and coolies must do the; work. They are immunes; it is their element; and tho cheap-labor system can never be terminated without materially impairing jiroduction, 'I'he sugar barons and refiners know this, and they kimw that juo- duction will not be stopped.
This is foreshadowed in I'resideut McKiuley's message submitting the annexation treaty to the Senate in these words:
What t lie conditions of sncli a union bIi.iII be, tlio politicnl rcl.ition tlirrcof to tlio Unili'd SLatci, tlio cli.Tr.icter of the local :idiniiii»trati«n, tli<> (|iiality and «lcpreo of the eleclivo IVanchiso of tlio inbabitantn, llio oxtensioii of the Todcral law3 to the territory, or the ciiartnieiit of gpocial laws to (it the |>i'ciiliar<'ouditiou tlioroof, the ie;;iilatlon, if nrod be, of tin,' labor systi-ni tberuiu, an- all uiatteiH which the treaty baa wisely reb jjated to Coiiiiies^."
The labor system will be regulated to meet the peculiar conditions on the islands. That is, the coolie system will bo permitted, beeauso of the inability to ]>rocuro other labor. The sugar barons know what that means. 'J'licy know what regulation of the labor system and laws of the United States is required by the "peculiar comli- tion." Hy aum-xation they would secure everything to be desired, and with their monopoly of the interest they would go on accumu- lating millions upon millions at the exi)ense of the citi/eiis of this cmintry. I firmly believe that niiicb of the annexation sentiment is inspired by the sugar barcms on the islands and the sugar relincrs of this country. I am convinced that if tho treaty had to run for a quarter of a century yet tho Hawaiian authorities would not have juoposed annexation.
I^ast year there were 2S.782 laborers employed on the sugar ]ilan- tations, and only l.lUT of them were natives, 'jhere wire 12.823 Japanese, (!,2Mt t'liiiusc, 2,2t!>' Portuguese. andTl"' of "fhei natiouaii- 34tl
1
8
ties, nearly all under the contract system, and not an American amongst tliem. Great solicitude is expressed by gentlemen for the Lii^h minded Americans who are said to have gone to the Islands to carry with them the beauties of American civilization. We are told that they have rescued the islands from heathenism and educated and Christianized the natives. There doubtless have gone to that benighted people many worthy representatives of our Christian civilization; but of those who are there actively urging the scheme of annexation we know they have gotten substantially all the pro- ductive resources in their clutches ; they have monopolized the Gov- ernment; they have overrun the natives with sun- worshipers from the South Sea Islands and pagan coolies from China and Japan, that they might grow rich from their cheap sweat and toil.
Those high-minded gentlemen have overturned established insti- tutions and fixed upon the people an industrial system hardly a degree above absolute slavery. They are entitled to sympathy and encouragement indeed! The Saviour stigmatized better men as thieves and robbers and scourged them out of the Temple. Are we, Mr. Speaker, to be made the tools of these designing mercenaries and loan the great forces of our Government to enable them to fur- ther prey upon helplessness?
What possible interest has the American Sugar Trust in defeating the scheme of annexation? Hawaiian sugar has come to our mar- kets free of duty for twenty five years, and annexation would only make the arrangement permanent. That sugar comes hero in a raw state, and the trust does all the refining. The Hawaiian Sugar Trust is behind the whole scheme, and it is prolific of resources. Under the tarilF law of 1890 duties were removed from sugar, and Hawaii had no advantage in our markets over other sugar-growing countries. A bounty was paid to American sugar growers, and the Hawaiian barons had the audacity to set forces in motion with the view of effecting annexation so they could share in the bounty. Local disturbances were created, and the revolution of 1893 occurred and was made the pretext for immediate tender of dominion to this country. There is scarcely a doubt that that revolution was en- couraged by the sugar planters for the purpose of eflecting politi- cal union with this country and securing a bounty on their sugar product. In 1889 Mr. Merrill, who was our minister to the Hawaiian Government, wrote :
It is noticeable that .imong tlie American residenta in Hawaii lliere are several ■srlio, from personal motives, contemplate with satisfaction iieriodical ilisqnietnde in the Kingdom, hoping th.at frequent revolationary epoclis will force the United States Government to ni.ake these islands a part of its territory. * * * In order to keep affairs in as much turmoil as possible, baseless rumors are constantly- put in circulation, many of which find publication in other countriea.
Under the terms of the treaty of annexation negotiated by Presi- dent Harrison the Hawaiian planters were assured the benefits of our bounty law. Minister Stevens, under date of February 1, 1893, wrote Secretary of State Foster:
As to terms of "annexation," I still adhere firmly to the opinion that the Bugar bounty to be paid to the Hawaiian planters should bo Limited to 6 mills per pound— $12 per ton.
A bounty of $12 a ton on an output of 250,000 tons a year, paid by the people of this country to the Hawaiian sugar baroiis ! Three millions of dollars a year from American sweat and toil ! Is it auy wonder the oligarchy was keen to surrender tlie sovereignty of the islands to this country? They were willing to sell the birthright of the inoitensive natives, which they had gotten by artifice, for three millions a year of American gold. As far back as 1873 the same schemers were at work attempting to secure free markets in Bill
tliiH country. 'J'lioy were williu^j to Hiirrcn«l<M- tho moat nacrcd rights of llio pcoplo for Kixin. (icMicral ydiolielil, wlio is ro fro- qiioiitly (inoted l>y tho fiieiula of aiiiiuxatiou, wrote from the isliinds ill l^To these wonls:
T!ii< j;rp:il (il)Jo(t of tlio Ilnwniinn Clovpriinioiit in Rocking n rociprorify treaty With tlio l?iiiloJ Stall's lias bcoii, ami will prolialily roiiliniic to be, to r«.'Ili>ve llie eugar plaiitcra from llio oi)craliiin (if our tariir on'lluMrHtiKar. • • • IniK-i'd, tlio sujjar planters arosoaniioiis I'ora rciiproiil y trcntj-, or ho anxious, rather, lor "free tnulo" in sn-iar with Iho United .Slati'S, that many ortln-m ojwnly proclaim themselves in favor of "auueiatiou" of tlieso islands to tho United Slates.
That, Mr. Speaker, clearly exposes tho motives and nutliods of the Hawaiian oligarchy iu seeking annexation. (Jrced is their motive, and disingenuonsness tlicir method. I deplore tho existence of the American Sugar Trust, but as between it and tho llawaiiau trust my sympathies aro with tho Americati, for it does employ intelligent labor and contriljutes somewhat to tlio su|>port of free institutions, while, on tho other hand, tho Hawaiian trust enii)!oy8 none but cheap Asiatic labor and contributes to the maiutenanco of the coolio industrial system.
Hawaii is tlio paradise of commercial jobbers; it is tho worst trust-ridden country of tho hemisphere; its commerce, its produc- tion, its politics, and its conscience aro all controlled by corpora- tions. Do wo need it t Is there a necessity for any more trusts ia our country T Wo are asked to assumo tho Hawaiian public debt, amounting to $1,000,000, and remit taxes amounting to over $G,00O,00O a year for all time. Can wo aftord to pay that immense price for tho slight benefit wa would derive from control of tho ialandsT And that is only tho beginning, for there will bo forts, fortilica- tions, ocean cables, mail contracts, warship.s, enlarged armies and navies, and tho Lord only knows what all !
TUE SUGAn-BEET INDCSTRT.
A new impulse" lia.5 been given to beet-sugar production in this country by tho existing taritf law, and it is conlidently hoped that in tho near future American farmers will grow all of tho sugar required for our consumption. Our farmers can never compete witli Hawaiian sugar growers, with their advantages of climate and coolie labor, and tho effect will be either to retard beet-sugar productioa here or continue to put enormous profits in the coffers of the Hawai- ian sugar barons at the expense of American consumers. We can allbrd neither. Those islands produce annually about 1.'.">0,0(X) tons of sugar — over one-sixth of our entire importation. Tho farmers and wage earnei-s of this country, who constitute the power and glory of our civilization, stand as a unit against annexation.
Tho question for us to decide is, Will we legislate iu favor of the millions of farmers and laborers of America, who support onr insti- tutions, or in favor of tho sugar barons of tho Hawaiian Islands, who have been jireying upon our substanro like commercial cormo- rants for the last quarter of a century f I am for the fanners and laborers of this country.
TUE STUATEtaCAL QCE^TION.
The principal argument in support of annexation is fliat the islands aro so located that they would constitute a valuable naval outpost and would be especially dangerous to onr Pacific coast in the hands of a hostile power.
Tliey are de< hired to be the key to the Pacific Ocean, and we are told that if wo do not annex them, since thoy are so generously tendered to us, that wo will have no right to object to their occu- pancy by some of her country. It is tlie same old story that was told when we liad under consiileration the proposition to purehaso tho Island of St. Thomas of Denmark during President .lohnson'a Jul
10
Admiuistratiou and the proposition to annex Santo Domingo during President Grant's Administration. They were a key to eometbiug or some place, and we needed them for strategical reasons and to develop commerce.
President Grant, the greatest military genius of the ccntnry, threw all the weight of his personal, professional, and political influence in favor of acquiring Santo Domingo, and failed. He dem- onstrated its necessity from a military standpoint, and the danger of allowing it to go into the hands of a foreign power. He expati- ated upon its peculiar advantages in developing South American trade, and solemnly warned the country that if we failed to annex it a European power stood ready to pay $2,000,000 for Samana Bay alone, and that it would be sold. The Senate refused to ratify tho treaty, and the subject was dropped altogether out of politics. Samana Bay is still there under the same control, and our sense of security has not been disturbed a particle by our failure to acquire it. Our trade with South America has continued to develop, and no one now thinks the country made a mistake iu refusing to adopt the recommendations of President Grant.
The same old arguiueut has been resurrected, galvanized over, and made to do service iu support of the inoposition to annex tho Hawaiian Islands. It is supported by the opinions of a number of Acrj'^ respectable naval experts, who are fertile iu theory and barren iu experience, but they fail to make a better case for the pending- project than that greater military expert. President Grant, made iu favor of Santo Domingo twenty-live years ago. It is not an expert question, and must be settled by the application of common-sense rules and principles. Tho i>oiitical, industrial, and economical jihases of the proposition should receive attention as well as the strategical. AVhile I have a high regard for the opinions of naval experts on expert propositions, they are more than human if their judgments are not highly colored by professional training. A long course of study of one branch of government is apt to lead to an exaggerated estimation of its relative importance.
Mr. TAWNEY. Will the gentleman allow a question?
Mr. CKUMPACKEK. I prefer not to yield.
Mr. TAWNEY. I only wanted to ask the gentleman whether there is any relation whatever between the policy which tho Gov- ernment of the United States has pursued iu the past with respect to the islands of Hawaii and our policy with regard to San Do- mingo, of which the gentleman has iust been speaking.
Mr. CRUMPACKER. Yes; I think they are all within the range of thft Monroe doctrine. And I will take occasion to say right here
Mr. TAWNEY. Just one word further. Have we ever maintained the policy of not allowing other nations to interfere with San Do- mingo as we have done wath respect to the islands of Hawaii for tho last half a century?
Mr. CRUMPACKER. We have, most assuredly. Those islands are Avithiu the range of the Monroe doctrine ; and if now wo should permit the Sandwich Islands to go into the hands of a foreign power we should still be infinitely safer on the Pacific coast, according to the opinion of all naval and military experts, than we are on the Atlan- tic; and everybody in the country knows that we are in no danger whatever on tho Atlantic coast. [Applause.]
Mr. GIBSON. Wait till we get into war with a country that has a navy, and you will find out whether our Atlantic coast is iu danger.
Mr. CRUMPACKER. The countries that have great navies are BO weakened in their domestic situation that they do not dare to go 3411
11
to war. Thoy have jcalousios at lioiuu. Siiaiu h.i.s umic, Lecuiise she i8 too small and iii('(>nso<]ticuti:iI.
ThtTo aro niiiiuToii.s islaiida iu much rlnsor proxiiiiitv to our oast- eru coast than thu llawaiiaii.s aro to tlm we.st<-rn, and wo do not own a 8in;^lo ouo of tlioni; tlioy aro ownt'd lar;;cly by Kuropcan powers, and yet we appn-heud no danp(ir from that source. In fact, tlio Hawaiian Ishunls aro Bulistantiallj' as far from our western shores as Ihirojio is from our eastern, and with all of our years of oxperienco and intercourse 1 doubt if wo would liavo l.unipo moved farther away if wo could. Aro islands in the hands of a forei^ju
i lower a greater menace to ua ou the west side than ou tho ea^itf f so, for what reasiui?
Would the Hawaiian Islands, under tho control of Great Hritain, Le a source of greater danger to the racilic coast than tho 15cr- mndas, only a few hundred mih^s away, are to tiie Atlantic coast f Contingencies niaj' arise that would make tho islands of some im- portance to us as a base of naval operations; conditions might exist under which their occui)ancy l>y a foreign power would be u matter of some concern to us. Hut the question is. Are those coniingeneiea and conditions so likely to exist as to Justify us in departing from our historical policy and entering upon tho dangerous experiment of territorial exjiausionf Would they not bring ua more evil than good! Six months ago no one would have dreamed of the highly Bcnsational uaval conllict that recently occurred at the Philippine Islands.
If that brilliant event could have Leon foreseen, naval expert* would have been profuse in theories favoring tho aciiuisition of territory for strategical purposes iu tho Orient. Warfare is a suc- cession of surprises, and no wisdom has foresight enough to know- where the next battle will bo fonght. Naval warfare must make its own facilities; it is not within tho range of reason that wo Cf should acquire possessious all over the globe for naval depots,
"i There aro stronger reasons for the acquisition of territory on the
continent of Asia for naval purpasos than inthecenter of the PaciUo "* Ocean. If wo owned those islands wo would bo compelled to
protect them; they are within 2,000 miles of other islands in the South £ea that could bo made the base of formidable uaval operations. They can not protect themselves, and Pearl Harbor, however well fortified, could only protect tho entrance to Oahu. There are six or seven other inhabited islands iu tho group, witii moans of ingress and egress more or less adequate, and they could be appro.achedand devastated by a naval force. They must be pro- tected and the maintenance of a squadron of warshipa there would be necessary.
Mr. TAWNEY. Will tho gentleman name one of those harbors?
Mr. CIUJMl'AClvKK'. I suggested that thcro were live or six islands with means of ingress and egress moro or less adequate. Thoy are approached by commercial agencies; thoy cau be ap- proached by soldiers as well.
Mr. Hli< >M\VELL. Will tho gentleman allow mo to ask
Mr. CHU.MPACKKR. I prefer not to be interrupted. In war we would tJieube compelled to light in mid ocean, 2,000 miles from our natural stronghold, where our invincible force could not be avail- able. As we aro now situated we can select tho theater of art ion; wo can withdraw to our coasts or attack an enemy wherever ho is exposed. Wo have no insular territory to defend and consequently can select tho battle grouml. Do we desire to surrender tli.it imjiort- aiit ailvantagef i^pain had a fortified harbor in Manila as strong as Pearl Harbor, and yet there was a Dewey. Are wo to learn nothing from Spain's oxpericncet Her naval outpost at the Philippines id 3441
12
a soui'L'e of weakness— a cause of her ovcrtbiow. Sbe liiis, in addi- tion, Porto Kico, Cuba, and the Canaries to defend, all far removed from her continental stronghold, and she is helpless.
In the present conflict we can choose the battlefield. We can attack her most vulnerable point. If she had no insular posses- sions she could withdraw to the continent and be almost invincible against our arms, and yet gentlemen insist that such possessions are a source of military strength. If it had not been for her islands Spain would not have been involved in the war. That is a point of no mean significance. England, with her mighty navy, is com- pelled to distribute it around over the world so that it can hardly be said to be formidable. The more naval outposts and sujiply depots a country has scattered over the seas in time of war the more its naval power must be divided. Outlying possessions give rise to complications in ways that can not l)e foreseen, and that country is safest from disturbance that has the fewest of them, and it is strongest in time of war. They excite jealousies and distrust and breed misunderstandings; they aiford a pretext for burdening the productive energies of a country with a large army and navy, and handicap it in the conquest of trade.
But friends of the proposition express the fear that if we con- tinue to maintain the jjolicy of excluding foreign control of the islands we will be involved in dangerous complications with other powers which would be averted by annexation. What has been our experience in that lino? During all our relations with the islands we have had infinitely less trouble with them and on their account than we have had with Alaska since our purchase of that Territory. There is now a judgment of half a million dollars stand- ing against us growing out of complications brought with the Alaskan possessions — more than Hawaii has cost us in all her his- tory. It is conclusively demonstrated that annexation multiplies perplexities from which we could otherwise be free.
But, Mr. Speaker, we are told that if wo control the Hawaiian Islands our Pacific coast will bo secure from attack, because no war ship can carry coal enough to steam from any other port on the Pacific Ocean, do any fighting, and return. Naval engagements arc usually of short duration ; a few hours are sufficient to destroy a mighty fleet, so destructive are the implements of warfare. We have existed with safety for a hundred years without control of the Hawaiian Islands, and they grow of less imi^ortance to us with every improvement of war ships.
Eussia just contracted for a number of war ships and cruisers, some of which are to bo constructed by American contractors, and they are to have capacity enough to carry coal to steam from St. Peters- burg to Port Arthur, a distance of 17,000 miles. A ship of that capacity could leave Hongkong and run to the Pacilic coast, bombard the coast cities for a week, andreturn without any incon- venience. It could demolish every city on the coast outside of Alaska and have time to spare. With continued improvement and the prospect of revolution in motive power by electricity, warships are likely to be constructed within the next decade that will carry supplies enough to circumnavigate the globe. Our strength is in our isolation and a patriotic citizenship, and our shield is in an atti- tude of dignity and justice toward all mankind.
The policy of territorial expansion will necessarily involve ub in complications in foreign politics, with which we should have no concern. Wo need no additional territory for any of the purposes of peace, and war is justified only when there is no other honorable recourse. If we intend to annex the islands at all, it would be most unwise to consummate the act in the face of the present situation. 3U1
13
StateBnianship will not bo inisled l)y (ho pioviiiliim oxcitPtnent to (Id tbat wlik'li ini;^lit niutfriully cripplo iis in tln' |iro-«rulion of tlio jirosont war. We liavn :i Cootliolil on tlio I'liilipiiint? IsIiukIm, ami in- ilisiTeet (leclaralionH aio he;uil on all hands, that it nhall ho our policy to piTMiancnlly occupy thoni. l-'oreign coimtries aro apt to niiHJndfjo our puii)o.so8. rrecii>itato anucxation wonld ho looked upon as a niovonicnt prolitninary to the coniploto suhjiij^ation of tho I'hilippines, and would bo construed as thi^ inau;iMratioii of au a^r^rcssivo policy of territorial expansion. It \V(Mild cxcito tho ai)i)rehcnsion of lluropem powers and lose us their moral supjiort, and perhaps invito intervention aijainst us; our preteu.sioii of humanity would bo justly rej^arded as liypocritical cant.
^^'o have our Monroo doctrine, tho oxistemo of which is recog- nized tho worlil over, and by force of an analogous law controlliuj^ tho ])olitic3 of tho Old World the jjowcrs would find abundant justitication to intervene and rebuke what they wouhl reyard as audacity on tho part of this Goverumcnt.
THE " WAR NECESSITY."
There is nothina: iu the oxigenciea of the present war that re- quires tho annexation of the islands. Our occupation of tho Phil- il)pines, if our protestations and professions aro to bo regarded, will bo only temporary. Unless wo permit the war to degenerate from a righteous movement for the relief of oppressed humanity into a greedy conquest for colouial spoils, our military foothold in the Orient will soon terraiuate. Tho only need we have for Hawaii now is for a supply station on the line of communication between tho continent au(l the Philippines, and that we have already in our unqualified right to Pearl Harbor for tliat purpose. Our right to that harbor is complete and exclusive, and our uso of it, under the terms of the grant, can not possibly involve the Hawaiian Gov- ernment in complications, because it has no control over the harbor as against this country.
The graut is in these terms:
His m.-ye^tr, th« King of the Il.'twaiian Islands, pr.mts to Iho GovemnieTit of tlie L'niteil States tho oxrhisivo right to enter the harbor of ro.irl Kiver, in tho Island of Oahu, and tu establish and maintain thi'ro n coalin<; and rejiair station for tho uso of vessels of tho United States, and to tlmt end the I'nitcd States may improve tho cntranco to said harbor and do all other things ucedi'ul to tho x>urpose aforesaid.
If the grant should ho terminable with tho treaty, which is a do- hatablo question, it could not bo terminated by either party under a year, and that, in all probability, will bo as long as wo will be re- quired to maintain our force in tho Philipy)incs, unless it shall be tho intention to continue to occupy those islands for the puqioso of coercing annexation. The possibility of tho Hawaiian Government terminating the treaty is too remote to bo worthy of consideration unless tho oligarchy should conclude to take the preliminary step iu tho existing crisis in tho hope that it would compel annexation. Tho stream of gold, at tho rate of fG,(XX',000 a year, (lowing from this country into tho pockets of tho sugar barons iu Hawaii is au adequate guaranty that tho treaty will continue.
I have no doubt there aro inlluential citizens of those islands who would glaiily involve their Government in tho existing com- plications with tho view of promoting tho scheme of annexation. Let that Government decl.ire neutrality between tho belligerents and its declaration, if honestly kept, will be respected. Let this country depenil upon its grant for the uso of Pearl Harbor for .1 8npi)ly station and the question will be solved. We will have all that we require and Hawaii will be entirely free from the controversy. 3111
14
And, besides this, it is au uudeniable fact that there is a feasible route from San Francisco to the Philippines by way of our Aleutian possessions which is over 800 miles shorter tha,n the Hawaiian route. It is always open and practicable, and possesses as safe, convenient, and adequate a harbor and supply station as Pearl Harbor. The temperature in the coldest weather is never lower than 7"^ Fahreu- lieit, and it very rarely reaches that point. 15ut there have been no sugar kings on the Aleutians to advertise their advantages; con- Bequently that important line has been almost overlooked by the country. It answers every purjiose of a supply station in support- ing our forces in the Philippines, and we already own it.
Mr. TAWNEY. I suppose the gentleman knows that Pearl Har- bor can not be entered by a single vessel at the X)reseut time, owing to the bar.
Mr. CRUMPACKER. I know that the Hawaiian Government Las permitted us to store 12,000 or more tons of coal in an accessi- ble harbor, and will subject herself to no liability whatever under the laws of nations in permitting us to go and take that coal.
Mr. TAWNEY. That is in the harbor of Honolulu. The gentle- man was talking of Pearl Harbor.
Mr. CRUMPACKER. It can make no difference; whenweplaced our coal there we acquired the right to go after it.
THE ISLANDS WILL NOT GO TO AXOTHEE COUNTRY.
But if we don't take the islands some other country will, is the alternative that is submitted to us by the advocates of the propo- sition. Suppose Mexico should propose political union with this country and notify us that if the jiroposition were not accepted she would tender a surrender of her sovereignty to France or Germany; do gentlemen confess that we would be remediless? Are they will- ing to have the Monroe doctrine so construed and limited? I imagine not. Wo do not want Mexico in our political household, and would resist any proposition that placed her under the control of any European power. The same is true in relation to the Ha- waiian Islands. If we do not choose to accept them we will not be estopped to prevent their passing under the dominion of any for- eign power. ]>ut there is no danger of such a contingency. The specter of foreign control is conjured up for the purjiose of exciting our cupidity and apprehension.
Have we forgotten San Domingo so quickly? The sugar barons of the islands, who constitute the governing power, realize full well that uuiou with any foreign country would mean the abrogation of the commercial treaty and the loss of their gieat advantage in the American markets. It would cost them over $5,000,000 a year, and that they will never submit to willingly. There is no lia- bility of their proposing annexation to anj"^ other country, and if any power should attempt to take them by conquest this country would immediately prevent it. That fact is a guaranty of their safety from foreign molestation, as no government will take the hazard of a war with this country to possess those islands. There is absolutely no force in the suggestion that they are becoming- orientalized and will ultimately go to Japan by absorption.
The Jai>anese and Chinese laborers on the islands were brought there by the sugar barons under the contract system. Thousands of 1 hem weve imported by the Dole oligarchy. They are there for fixed lorms, and are required to return to their own country when the term of service expires. The treaties require the Hawaiian Govern- ment to guarantee the performance of the contracts, and to furnish them transportation back to their homes at the tormiuation of the period of employment. They are not naturalized, and have no polit- G4tl
15
ical lights. Tlioy do not have their faiuilioa, and aro only sojoiirn- ors. This accounts lor Iho largo discropaucy bi'tweon the sexes on the islands. Tho sui^ar f^rowcrs need their labor, and iluxe is no Bontiniciit lor their exclusion.
Japan has evinced no disposition to seize the islands. It is true fiho protested ajjainst annexation to tiiis country, becanso it would dissolvi>the llawaiiansovoreiRiityandilestroy tho guaranty under 111 « Jai)anes(» treaty. Japan quite likely li.is some concern on aceoiint of tlio well known hostility of tliis country toward Mongolian im- migration. There need be no fear whatever of anncx.ition to or absorption by any other country as long as we ]irotest. Our protest alone, of which the world already has notice, isasuflicieut guaranty of their safety and neutrality.
The operations of Kuropcan powers in China is a cause for no api)reheusion on the part of this country. Kuro])e is no more dangerous in .\sia than it is in Europe. It is in easy across to our e.-vstern coast, and has given us no disturbance, and it will bo equally as harmless in Asia.
IIAWAU AND THi; PACIFIC COMMEHCK.
Mr. Speaker, much importance is attached to the islands because of their relation to the commerce of tho Pacific Ocean. There is no reason why we can not fully enjoy their beuelits from a commercial standpoint without annexation. Wo can not hope to profitably extend our foreign trade by tho policy of territorial exjiausiou. Commerce has no sentiment or aH'eetion — the ethics of international trade are those of tho bargain counter — and tho country that has the greatest advantages in production will control tho greatest share of tho world's trade. We already have Pearl Harbor for a coaling station. All civilized countries are engaged in trade, and they gladly welcomo cargoes of commerce into their ports and readily extend hospitalities to tho carrying vessels.
It is not necessary that we have a coaling station in our own right wherever we send a trading vessel. iShips are provided with coal in tho various parts of tho world with as much alacrity as their crews are provided with entertainment at the hotels. What would bo thought of tho proposition to maintain a United States shoo store in London, so Americans traveling abroad could procure foot- wear? How many foreign countries bavo coaling stations ujion our coasts? Where have our ships gone on comiuercial missions that they have had any dilliculty in procuring coal if any was to bo hadf
\\ ho is ready to conless, in tho face of our marvelous growth, th.xt our eouimereial policy has been a failure? Sir, with high-priced labor anil high rate of interest in this country our imnlucers have made wonderful cominests in the world's markets in the last few years. Our fonimi trade is increasing at an unparalleled rate, not- withstanding tlu^ many disadvantages wo labor under and the proverbial wastefulness of tlie Aiiu*riean people. Tho manufaetur- iug uatii>ii3 of tho Old World, by force of haidt and surroundings, aro comjiolled to maintain enormously expeiibivo standing armies and navies. It has been s.iid that ovcry toiler in Germany has to carry a soldier or .1 sailor on bis back.
Those countries ;iro badly handic.ipjjed by that condition, from whieh we are now coiu]»arativoly Irce. t.)ur isidatiou is our jirinci- pal safeguard, and the advantages it contains has enabled us to achieve remarkablo tiium|dis in jiroduction and trailo. We <lo not realize tho ennrmous adv.intage our |><'siiii)u gives us, or th' ro would bo no sentiment in favor of siirrenilenng it. Tiio burden is so great on foreign countries that they are now contcmjilating a treaty for tho purpose of limiting, by mutual covenant, the size of 3H1
Lfil?!!"'*^ "'■ ^"NUKt:.^
0 013 744 617 0
16
their armies and uavies. It is sbortsiglited and suicidal for us to enter upon a policy that will take from us the important advan- tage wo now eujoy.
Our trade can never be extended by cannon or warships, but it will continue to increase until wo have achieved commercial su- premacy, if we do not surrender the immense advantage we now possess. Our strength is not, and will never be, in our Army and Navy, but in the contentment and intelligence of our citizenship. Our greatest danger is not from external force, but from internal discontent and disintegration. As long as our people are united in sentiment and prosperous we are invincible against the whole world, but if we are torn by discord and shattered by discontent our strength will depart though we have the mightiest navy that ever rode the seas. We are strongest when the burdens of Govern- ment are lightest.
I deprecate the policy that would cause this country to take from the multitude their hard-earned substance, so much needed in industrial development, to build a navy equal to those maintained by the European powers. The policy of territorial expansion will compel us to do that. It would be immeasurably better in an emer- gency to go into the markets of the world to buy war ships and cruisers than to invest millions upon millions of money in times of peace, needed in developing production, to the construction of float- ing palaces of steel and have them rust and rot on the sea.
A large navy does not, in my judgment, tend to secure peace. Nations, like individuals, often act upon impulse, and if there be time for reflection difliculties may be settled amicably and war obvi- ated. Does any gentleman on this floor contend that it would pro- mote domestic peace for all of our citizens to carry firearms and dirk knives in their daily intercourse? That which is true of individu- als is likewise true of nations.
I am in favor of a navy reasonably commensurate with onr neces- Bities, considering our isolated situation. I would have war ships sufficient for coast police and defensive purposes and a reasonable nucleus, in addition, for oftensive operations ; but I would not unnec- essarily burden the people of the country for the support of a great navy just for its glory.
If we take the proposed step in this crisis, it will surely launch us upon a policy of territorial aggression and colonial imperialism, carrying complications in all parts of the earth, and our national peace will bo constantly threatened. I warn gentlemen that thirst lor power is a dangerous passion and hard to satisfy, for it will not be controlled by reason. The appeal to national pride always has a fascination hard to resist, and it is doubly powerful when the public mind is in an abnormal state of excitement, as it is to-day. The wisdom of statesmanship would defer action upon matters of such high importance until the passions of war subside and condi- tions will permit calm consideration.
This is a Government "of the people, by the people, and for the people," and I have faith in its splendid destiny and am jealous of its great powers, fearful always that they maj"^, through excessive zeal or mistaken judgment, be perverted. Let us try no dangerous or uncertain experiment; let us hesitate to change a policy the suc- cess of which is the acknowledged envy of the world; let ns profit by the wrecks of nations and individuals who were not satisfied to let well enough alone. [Applause.] ai4i
t *
^ *
< i
< i: Ii t "• , ,
i i f ^ * t fe' ij
* ^ i % t >• f' ■
' -^ ^ii( > > ;< '
. ; .^ # t "n 't ■«
^ * « < ^- ■ ^-
< (T i i «| «. 1^ i,
. A _^ 4, \i > ;< ^i; "
'i '• >
^ «: n
K I. 4 < i y \ % ^
*' « t I H
\ m I 'it
*^^* •. «: fj * 'a
\ <; * .«. ♦ t; «; *. ^ •
.t^*',» .'»; > i ai ii i?
» >' < t f, t] .1^ % f 4
■: A A A A A i V •; ■»: *i ^
^.< ^ ,^ ,^ .t!,ii i If 4:
A A X A. >
* I.
C'i; 4i: '-^ « |( If,
,^4 ^^ A A i
^. # % t %• i: «
^' * H If' * M '
' t A 4 A
. .1 f: « «■ ' C f t. "« ■-
« ^ t ». «: € 1^ # ,. 1 < « ■< # i ir 4r f 4
A t" n; t % t i «[ «i «: ^
^ 4 4 t *t t '< ¥ > # «^ V . i t i k i i 9i ^ i 0i ^4 A - ^<i i A A 'c € A'r A A A A A i ti A A A AM ^" ' ^' ■
\ ^ 4 A, «' i ■#
' ' " 1^ * %^ i A ii
* « Y
It t *
« if « 4 < ¥ ■<! # '
i i <^ i- C ... «». *. ft f A '
Hi t i 4 A A
'^ ^ Ai A. A, t A 4 A''-4 i; A^ A # # >"•
«j .^ .^ ^ If] f #1 'tf "<f 'ic 'j^ •
.^."^ .*:.*' ^ « ^^ :t^ t' X' I A A' ^ A i
i'^i.^A /. A^^ A-^ >'^' *• ^'•-
,M A J .*; < -iC *^ «?► ., 4; A^ iT 4^ ■ ■
ij r '^ 11 ^ 1} *r«9 Ai ii *; ii, ^ M i ■
^Ai ^ A ^\J] A *1 A ^1 ^ *] '*3 *] *] '! * A^.^ .^^ '< ,*L^1 *1 *I '^^ «= *; ♦i *^ ^I ^ ^'^ '*'
il 6? ^ ^? .1 *?i \jr .^ '^ *^ir *«i *^5 ^-^ ^.^ ' > -.<,*»•*
i^ m. w
•■ <t ■ !• ^ ^ .^ ... ..
Pb ti ;t it: 'i :i ,t I .*v yi, p,. #,. ^. ii.
l>^ ^ if yit if ^f^ "f- ^ (t ^ js ,t 'It ft .
/i«, 1;^ is. ^ ";^- ^' ^^
[r [» :r^ ■* '^^ '" "^ '*
I«V^^1
, «.'-. V.-? . k" .. V" , ..- ,
11'^ jft, ;t, »'^ i|; ;,
?i-^ ?i' [f^
t' ^■
v!*^*
ii:ii':^i
'M .t
*■ i/ i:. ;- ' ' Silt
^ J> ^' #■ 1: ■■
^t, »..r^. ...
It ^ [f: ^ ,i ^^
I (I ^ I|. J i
&/J*,.ii *^ * t I ^ V*. i^ife » » t # 1^. 1
;{t' ■^. .*■ I :* # :# t ;
^t f«'. <^.- J ^ it 1 ^"^ t #^.^ * ■«■■ i' *' L .,
^ (* ^ % 1 *: % It '-
,, # # vft- # .1^. ^aa^g:
|
(?^^ '^v yi. it. ^; If: li ,; |
W^ |
|
1_ t ^ || 1^.. # |, 1 f #. #. ^1::- ;* i |. |
|
|
a > # ii -k "k '$ i . #. *. >, ^ !*. il^ i; f '>. # i^ ;t k- % \ |
:;;^Vt |
|
il t 'i ii- :% 'f 'tt. . |
|
|
."* V* iT ■'.? li*. l"*. .% :'■ » *- 1, 1^ *' *■ » ^ |
|
|
i. *^ i m ■* i f .» .11^ ^1: ll. M'. %> % ^ ' i^' |
"* .!'. |
|
r* # jP-. p. p. # '|F'. h ^ i i ■ 1 i t i f |
|
|
^ ■#.,.#;. t $/$- !# |: |
i;f'"- |
P 1, P il^ i» t f
*■ it * If
• # .W .1
#: -P ^ II: P I t '^^ »■
^ .«! -'J.t! « i * V
4 4 « i J *■,•; ^ «!^^ .tj rf"<^}i'i-<■• <1 v <■ « «^ •. t t.. f « t: i I 1 « f
% • t
: t (: ( iS t
'♦ t t (' i » US L ,
.i < i t X -
t ^ « t ^ '^ ^ ^ ^ i %\ ^ i f i i ■< 1' f >
i i f ^ ^ t "t * -^' '
' I « ^ i - , .
, ♦. . i . .t # # i i *r ' r ^ t i) i $ i 'f ^ "i
t € f * # ■«) > .«' ' '*.**! I. 'I. ■- - ■ i •• ^ 4 ■* 'i - f .1 * i •
,..^J J .* .* ^-
'l T t (. . ^ #, <■■ .
: t C I 1
* < i; * f it
''^ <• 4 <i i«^ * f ^
^f^ i ii * ^' < ^ < ■ i
'< « « 4 * '-'
|
« -1, « % X t |
• 4 |
• i 4 « i t i! A •; C i; % i( %: t; %, 4,- , r f ? V -• r; |
|
|
' t t » « t % H t Ik |
f; - |
||
|
* |
t <l c |
||
|
If' i % ^ |
**•* * -^ >> .^ * « *^«: •^ * t^ * «' "f , |
||
|
,'» '* A |
|||
|
t 9 4 1 |
|||
|
%■ 'i « f' f V i i > t |
.^ >: t n s: *ii • . ♦, t; «; * < ■< /»j * 1 *: * i t f] i: 1 r v |
*; *
»■ r t
€ 1^
ir*>"
« «' ft ft
^t. ^ «"v'a; i n: #: ii; ^ i ♦ i| %^ ^ § , ^ ^
•^ J ^< /' ,^> >^ ■.^- >' « * * '^J ^ > ■•^' '*' ■»■ '*' '"*; "^